Michigan Law Review
Volume 15

Issue 8

1917

Recent Important Decisions
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Courts Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, Recent Important Decisions, 15 MICH. L. REV. 667 (1917).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol15/iss8/5

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
CRIMINAL LAW-DIRECTED VERDICT oF ACQUITTAL-The accused was con-victed of crime. Error was assigned upon the refusal of the court to direct
a verdict of not guilty. Held, that a motion to direct a verdict of acquittal
!'hould never be entertained. People \T. Zurek (Ill. I9I7), n5 ·N. E. 644.
Inasmuch as th~ court also ruled that the verdict of guilty was not contrary to the evidence, that part of the decision touching upon the policy of
directing a verdict of acquittal was probably not necessary to the decision.
The point was, however, considered by the court of review and a definite
policy of practice was laid down. The great weight of authority supports
the doctrine that a court cannot instruct a jury in a criminal case to return a verdict of guilty. See 16 Cor.. L. REv. 594 and note to Ann. Cas. l9I6A
1241. There are a few cases which uphold the opposite view. P=ton v.
State, n4 Ark. 393, 170 S. W. So, Ann. Cas. l9I6A 1239; People v. Worges,
176 Mich. 685, 142 N. W. noo; Commonwealth v. Brown, 28 Pa. Sup. Ct.
296. The Illinois court declared itself in favor of the orthodox rule, and apparently justified its policy of not allowing directed verdicts of acquittal
on the ground 1hat a verdict of acquittal should not be directed when a
verdict of guilty could not be so c!irected~-the end sought apparently being
a mutuality of remedy as between the state and the defendant. This conclusion, however, d~s not follow, for courts refuse to direct a verdict of
guilty because such action is held to interfere with the accused's right fo a
jury trial, while there is no such objection to ordering a verdict of acquittal.
Further, a judge can set aside a verdict of guilty when it is contrary to the
evidence, and can continue to do so indefinitely, even though he cannot set
aside a verdict of acquittal, and it is submitted that a trial court should
have the pow~r and duty to direct a verdict of not guilty in the first in, stance rather than to allow a series of new trials. The theory of mutuality
breaks down, even in Illinois, so far as respects the power to set aside a
'erdict, and a corresponding inequality as regards the power to direct a
verdict is certainly not unreasonable or anomalous. This view is supported
by the authorities. State v. Trove, l Ind. App. 553, 27 N. E. 878; State v.
Brown, 72 N. J. L. 354. 6o Atl. III7; Murphy v. State, 124 Wis. 635, 102
N. W. 1o87; People v. Ledwon, 153 N. Y. 10, 46 N. E. 1046.
DIVORCE-CUSTODY OF CHILDREN IN CASE OF DENIAJ, OF DIVORC~-The plaintiff sued for divorce fr_om h~r husband on the ground of cruelty. The divorce was denied; but as the parties were not living together, the court gave
the plaintiff custody of the three children. The Divorce Statute provided
that although decree for separation * * ": be not made the court may make
decree for the support of the wife and children. Held, that under this
statute the court, though denying a divorce to the wife, may award her the
custody of th~ children. Jacobs v. Jacobs (Minn. 1917), 161 N. W. 525.
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The cases are not in accord upon the question decided in the principal
case. In some of the states there are statutes dealing with this question
and similar to the statute in the principal case and in others there are not.
The statute mentioned above was copied from the New York statute, but
the New York cases reach a different conclusion. The earlier New York
'statute did not authorfae a granting of custody of the children when there
was. no decree for divorce and 5eparation, and the court held that t)Je intent of the statute above, passed later, was merely to authorize granting
of custody in c.~ses where <the wife had statutory grounds sufficient to get
a separation but had waived th~m or condoned the offense. Davis v. Davis,
75 N. Y. 221; Atwater v. Atwat.Jr, 36 How. Prac. 431; Davis v. Davis, I
Hun 444; Do11glas v. Df)uglas, 5 Hun 140; Robinson v. Robinso1i, 131
N. Y. Supp. 26o. In other states where the statute is similar the right to
a decree of custody has been upheld. Cornelius
Corne'lius, 31 Ala. 479;
.Tolmson·v. Johnson, 57 Kan. 343; in Re .Cooper, 86 Kan. 573. In' Anderson
v. Anderson, 124 Cal. 48, maintenance was given a wife for herself and allowance for support of her minor child. But see Brenot v. Brenot, 102 Cal.
294 Other cases granting custody, where no statute was mentioned are:
_};noll v. Knoll, II4 La. 703; Horlon v. Horton, 75 Ark. 22; Hoskii1s v. Hosl:i11s, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 435. Contra, Garrett v. Garrett, II4 Ia. 439; Thomas
v. Thomas, 250 Ill. 354; 'King v. King, 42 Mo. App. 454- It is settled that when
the husband and wife have separated and are living apart the cou'rt may de.termine which parent shall have the custody of the children· in habeas corpus
proceeding. The instant case contains· an exhausti~e discussion of the authorities and s~ems to have -~lightly the weight of authority with i~.

v.

EVIDENct-BLOoDHOUNns.-Appellant was tried and convicted of crime.
At the trial testimony as to the conduct of a bloodhound was offered by the
state as evidence
the accused's guilt, and was rejected as incompetent
and inadmissible. In spite e>f the ruling, some evidence of this kind was introduced incidentally. in proving other facts. The appellant's requested instruction to the effect that evidence as to the bloodhounds' should not be considered in determining his guilt was refused, and later a motion for a new
trial was overruled. .Held, that a new trial should be granted for error in
n,ot giving the instruction, requested. Ruse v. State· (Ind: 1917); IIS N. E.
778.
.
.
.
The decision in the principal case, holding that blot>dhound evidence· is
incompetent and inadmissible, is supported by few very recent cases. People v. .Pfanschmidt, 262 Ill. 4n, 104 N. E. 8o4, Ann. Cas. 1915A n71; Stout
\'. State, t74' Ind. 395, 92 N. 'E. 161, Ann. Cas. 1912D 37; Brott v. State, 70
Neb. ;395, 97 N. W. S93, 63 L. R. .A. 789. For a diseussion of "the competeiicy of the conduct of bloodhounds as evidence in criminal cas-es" see 2
MICH.
REv. 402: The great. majorify' of cases are agreed in holding· that
upon a proper foundation :being first laid as to the fraining, testing, and
experience of a dog in trailing human 'beings, evidence is admissible as to
his conduct, actions, and doings while following the trial of one accused of

of

£.
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crime, the weight of such evidence to be determined by the jury in the light
c:.f all the surrounding circumstances. Pedigo v. Commonwealth, 103 Ky. 41,
44 S. W. 143, 42 L. R. A. 432, 82 Am. St. Rep. 566; State v. Adams, 85
Kan. 435, u6 Pac. 6o8, 35 L. R. A. N. S. 70; Carter v. State, 106 Miss.
507, 64 So. 215, 50 L. R. A. N. S. n12; Hargrove v. State, 147 Ala. 97, 41
So. 592, IO Ann. Cas. n26; State v. Norma11, 153 N. C. 591, 68 S. E. 917.
For a full collection of cases see notes to 42 L. R. A. 432; 35 L. R. A. N. S.
870; Ann. Cas. 1912D 39; Ann. Cas. 1915A n93. The ruling in the principal
case seems indicative of a moder:i tendency to hold -this kind of evidence
inadmissible,-at least in northern jurisdictions.
EvIDENCE-EXCLUSION oF TESTIMONY AS TO How :CrnEL MADE LIBELED
PERSON FEEL.-Plaintiff, a minister, sued defendant for a libel contained in

defendant's newspaper, calling the plaintiff an "interloper, a meddler, and a
spreader of distrust, discontent and sedition." A witness for the plaintiff
was asked how this libelous matter seemed to make the plaintiff feel. H elcI,
that the answer was properly -excluded because it called for the opinion of
the witness. Van Lo11kl111y::en v. Daily News Co. (Mich. 1917), 161 N. W.
979.

A search of the authorities discloses .that only one jurisdiction, Alabama,
follows the instant case. In McAdory v, State, 59' Ala. 92, in a prosecution
for arson it was held error for a witness to state that the defendant "looked
downcast," because it was merely a ·statement of the witness's opinion. To
the same effect, in Johnson v. State, 17 Ala. 618, the court held it error for a
witness to say "the prisoner looked serious, although habitually a lively
man!' In neither case ·did the courts give satisfactory. reasons, but simply
called it opinion evidence. Seemingly all the other authorities, for cogent
reasons, take the opposite view. In State v. M cK11igllt, II9 Ia. 79, 93 N. W.
63, the court held it proper for a witness to testify that the deceased when
sick "appeared to be despondent" and "did not seem hopeful," without stating the facts upon which he based his opinion, on the theory that it was
mixed fact and opinion. In State v. Bradley, 64 Vt. 466, 24 Atl. 1053, a
witness was permitted to testify that when accused of the crime the d-efendant "seemed kinder worried," because it is more a statement of a fact
. than of an opinion. In Fritz v. Hudson U11io1i Tel. Co,, 25 Utah 263, 71 Pac.
209, the statement "he looked at me in a disgusted way" just before his accident, was held to be a fact, not an opinion. In State v. Wright, n2 Ia.
436, 84 N. W. 541, it was held error to exclude the statement that the defendant "looked queer." Thes-e statements are of exactly the same character as the answer to the question in the instant case. The question would
at most, call for a mixed answer of fact and opinion and it seems, according to the authorities, shouid have been answered. But even admitting
that <the answer called for an opinion purely, it still should have been admitted. One of the exceptions !o the opinion rule allows a layman even
to give an opinion where it is practicaily _impossible for the witness to make
the jury see and hear what he saw and heard, by reciting the facts without
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giving his opm1on. This is precisely such a case. The witness could not
describe the appearance of the plaintiff to the jury to show how it made
him feel, as· well as he could inform the jury by his own impression from
seeing the plaintiff. The exception to ·the opinion rule should have been
applied, and the evidence admitted.
·
Evrm;Nct-EXPER'r MtDICAL T:i::s'l'lMONY BASED ON BoTH On1:i::cnv:i:: AND
SuBJJ::CTIVJ:: SYMP'l'OMS.-The plaintiff, a street car conductor, sued the defendant railroad company for personal injuries received by reason of defendant's negligence. Several weeks after the injury plaintiff was examined
by a physician for the purpose of quali:fying him as an expert witness. The
physician based his diagnosis both on physical examination and on the history of the injuries and their causes as related by .the pl;iintiff; and on the
trial he was allowed to state his opinion based qn both the objective and
the subjective symptoms. Held, that the expert opinioi:i formed by the intelligent diagnosis of both the objective symptoms and the history of the
case, including the causes of the injuries, were properly admitted, though
r.ot part of the res gestae. St. Louis & S. F. R. CQ. v. iV!cFall (Okla. 1917),
163 Pac. 269.
The above case takes an extremely liberal view, making no distinction
between an attending physician and one examining fpr the express purpose of testifying for the plaintiff. ·'f.here are Ci!Ses .hi Alabama, Californi.a,
Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Texas, Vermont, and vYiscon!?in, holding with the instant case. They go on the theory that a history of the case
is usually necessary to reach a correct intelligent, diagnosis, .wI:iich is ?-S · i~
portant in the case of an exper.t witness who is to render an opinion, as for
a.n attending physician who is to administer medicine. - See Qt1aife v. The
Chicago & N. W.R. R. Co., 48 Wis. 513; Misso11ri, K. & T. Rj•. Co. V; Rose,
19 Tex. Civ. App. 470; People. v. Shattuck, 109 Cal. 673, 42 Pac. 315. A number of states· allow past history as basis of the opinion, ;when stated to an
"'.tlending physician, but exclude it when given to a physician for the express purpose-of ~aalifying him to testify, on the theory that in the latter, case
the plaintiff is liable to make dangerous self-serving statements. See Hi11tz
, •. W.ag11er, 25 N. D. no, 140 N. ·W. 729; Gra11d Rapids & Ind. R. Co. v.
Hi111tley, 38 Mich. 537, 31 Am. Rep. 321; Darrington v. N. Y. & N. E11g-. R~
Co., -s2 Conn. 285, 52 Am. Rep. 590; James Edward v. Illi.nois Ce-11tral R .. R.
Co.~ 161 Ill. App. 630; Divine v. Rothschild, 178 Ill. App. 13,. Stat~ments
made to a physician called to treat a patient are usually very dependable;
for the patient is anxious to give the physician ·a true version of the history
of the case a_nd of his_ present condition to enable the physician to make a
correct diagnosis. But statemerits made to a physician called for _the purpose of qualifying him as an expert witness are very apt to include all that
is fav6rable to the plaintiff's case and exclude all _that is detrimental. Besides. there is always the possibility that the patient has given a fraudulent
version of his case. There is ·a tendency to make. statements to such a
J>hysician strongly self-serving. A few states hold that a physician may base
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his opinion both on objective symptoms and on statements of present pains
and sensations, but not on statements of past symptoms. lVilliams v. Great
Northern R. Co., 68 Minn. 55, 70 N. W. 86o. In the following jurisdictions
the statement of the past history of the case is held hearsay and inadmissible, the United States Courts, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina,
and South Carolina. The following are typical cases. People v. M11rplzy,
IOI N. Y. 126, 4 N. E. 326, 54 Am. Rep. 66!; Atlanta K. & N. Ry. Co. v.
Gardner, 122 Ga. 82, 49 S. E. 818; Gibler v. Q11i110•, Omaha & Kansas City ·
Ry. Co., 129 Mo. App. 93, 107 S. W. 1021. The authorities are practically
uniform that statements made by the patient about the cause of, and the
responsibility for, the injury are not admissible, unless as res gestae. Citi:;e11s
St. R. Co. v .Stoddard, IO Ind. App. 278, 37 N. E. 723.
INJUNCTION-RESTRAINING A NUMBER OF ACTS OF PICKE'l'ING ON THEORY
THAT THEY CONSTITUTE AN UNLAWFUL WHOLE.-The defendant company.
and its striking employees were enjoined from interfering in any way with
the telephone service of the defendant company. One of the strikers, in an
intervening petition, ass-erted his intention to interfere singly and in concert
with others with the business of the company, in every peaceable and lawful mariner possible. The intervenor and several of the other strikers were
attacfled for violation of the injunction. Upon motions questioning the
i.alidity of the proceedings held that the in)unction was not too broad to b~
'alid under the CLAYTON ACT. Stephens v. Ohio Slate Teleplzo11e Co. (1917),
240 Fed. 750.
The CLAYTON ACT prohibits the Federal courts from granting an injunction in labor disputes against the doing of any act "which might lawfully be done in absence of such dispute by any party thereto." The court
in the principal case says that there is nothing new in this statute; that it
represents the view taken universally by the courts before its passage. "'What
constitutes peaceful picketing may be answered," says the court, "by any fair
minded man if this question is asked, 'Would this be lawful if no strike
existed?'" In passing on the pleadings of the intervenor, the court says
that the declaration of the intention to interfere with 1:he business in concert with others by lawful and peaceful means is practically a confession of
~n unlawful conspiracy. The court says: "It is a legal proposition, too firmly
s~ttled 1o be disregarded, that two or more persons may not combine to employ activities, in which singly they might lawfully .engage, with an intent that the effect of their joint '.lction should be the injury of another." It
is submitted that this is sound. An act may be wrongful if committed by an
individual, but too insignificant to be regarded as "unlawful" or punishable,
while if participated in by many it would be punishable because of its serious consequences. There are a number of Federal cases in accord. Oxley
Stove Co. v. Cooper's foter11atio11al U11io11, 72 Fed. 6g5; Allis-<:Tzalmers Co.
\·. Iron l1Io11lders' Union, 150 Fed. 155; Tri-City Cent. Trades Co1111cil v.
Am. Steel Fo1111dries, 238 Fed. 728. Also see _George Jones Glass Co. v.
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Glass Bottle Blowers' Assn, 72 N. ]. Eq. 653, 66 Atl. 953. In a recent similar
case, the Minnesota court refused to grant an injunction, giving as its principal reason the difficulty of framing a decree. Gra11t Const. Co. v. St. Paul
Bldg. Tra_des Coimcil (Minn. I9I7), I6r N. \V. 520. Other state cases have
denied the doctrine of the principal case. Lindsay & Co. v. M 011ta11a Federation of Labor, 37 Mont. 264, 96 Pac. 127; Meier v. Speek, g6 Ark. 6I8,
132 S. W. g88. It is important to notice that these cases invariably involve
powerful labor unions. It is possible that the divergence of the decisions can
be somewhat accounted for on the ground that most State judges are
elected by popular vote while Federal judges and the judges in New Jersey
are appointed.
:
NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF. MANUFACTURER FOR FOREIGN SUBSTANCE IN
BREAD.-Plaintiff, while masticating a piece of bread, bit into a nail which
was below the surface and as a result lost two teeth. The loaf from which
the slice was cut was made by the defendant and solc;l to a grocer from
whpm it was purchased by the plaintiff's sister. The defendant offered no
evidence but rested at conclusion of the plaintiff's case. Held that the
defendant is liable, in the absence of proof of the exercise of ca.re and inspection in the manufacture of the bread, notwithstan!ling the lack of privity
of contract between the plaintiff and defendant. Freeman v. Sclmlts Bread
Company (I9I7), I63 N. Y. Supp. 396.
·
The decision in this case is in line with the tendency of recent New York
cases to extend the liability of a manufacturer who fails to exercise care
in the manufacture of his goods or 'in inspecting them before putting them
upon the market for sale. MacPhcrso1i v. B11ick Motor Co., 2I7 N. Y. 382,
III N. E. 1050, Ann. Cas. I9I6C 440; Miller v. Steinfeld, 160 N. Y. Supp.
8oo. The decision in the principal case is put squarely upon the ground
that a loaf of bread is an article which it is reasonably certain will become
ciangerous if so negligently made as to allow foreign substances to enter into
its manufacture. The earlier cases which considered the liability of a manufacturer, vendor or packer to th~ ultimate purchaser, as well as to persons
not in privity of contract, for in}uries from def~cts ip. the article sold, are
collected and discussed in the note to Tomtiizson v. Armour & Company, 19
L. R. A. N. S. 923. See also the note to Mazeetti v. Armour & Company,
48 L. R. A. N. S. 21·3, and the long list of cases there cited and reviewed.
'l'hese earlier cases limited the application of the doctrine announced in the
principal case to poisons; explosives and things of like nature which in their
normal operation are implements of destruction. See Thomas v. Winchester,
6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455; Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Company,
104 Mass. 64; Norton v. Sewall, 1o6 Mass. I43, 8 Am. Rep. 298; McCa/ferly
v. Mossberg & G. Mfg. ·co., 23 R. I. 38I, 50 Atl. 65I, 55 L. R. A. 822. 91
Am. St. Rep. 637; H11sct v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. Sos,
57 C. C. A. 237, 6x L. R. A. 303. We have seen the principle extended to
an automobile (MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra), to a stepladder
(Miller v. Steinfeld, supra.) and now to a loaf of bread, and apparently the
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end is not yet. Is it not time that we called a halt to this constantly growing list of manufactured articles that are considered so inherently dangerous in their nature as to put an absolute duty of inspection upon the manufacturer and an absolute liability, even to thos-e with whom he has no
privity of contract, if he fails to make such inspection? This criticism is
not directed at the conclusion reached by the court but at the basis on
which it rests its decision. The defendant contended that it was incumbent
upon the plaintiff to show that the defendant had been negligent in the
manufacture of the loaf and that the doctrine of res ipsa loq11it11r did not
apply. to such a case. But this contention was brushed aside and the doctrine
of res ipsa loq11it11r allowed to control. In that it would seem the court
was wrong. Why not put the case upon the ground that the defendant owed
a certain duty of care to the plaintiff and that for the plaintiff to recover
he must first show that the defendant has been negligent in the performance
cf that duty? This phase of the question is barely mentioned, while the
duty to inspect is stresS<!d to the point that would hold the defendant liable
at all events if he failed to make such inspection. In this regard, and in
putting a loaf ·of bread in the same category with deadly poisons, explosives,
and other dangerous instrumentalities the court placed its decision upon a
ground extremely hard to support. Opposed to MacPherson v. Buick .Motor
Co., supra, on which case the decision in the principal case was based, is
Cadillac Motor Co. v. Johnson, 221 Fed. 801, 137 C. C. A. 279, L. R. A. l915E
287, decided by the Federal Court in New York about a year before the
decision in MacPhersoi~ v. Buick Motor Co., by the New York Court of
Appeals.
ToR'I'S-STRIKES.-Employes of plaintiff, who is a retail grocer, ref.used to
pay their du-es to the local grocery clerks' union. The union, although having no trade dispute with plaintiff, declared a strike against him, and picketed
his place and sought to prevent persons from buying of him. Plaintiff brings
'suit against defendants as officers of the union and also as individuals representing the other numerous members. Held that the· acts were illegal,
~nd the union and its members were liable therefor. Harvey v. Chapman
et al (Mass. 1917), n5 N. E. 304
In a case like ihis, where the injury is intentionally inflicted, the crucial
question is whether there is justifiable cause for the. act. Martel v. White,
r85 Mass. 255, 6g N. E. 1085, 102 Am. St. Rep. 341, 64 L. R. A. 26o; Jackson
v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592, 36 N. E. 345, 24 L. R. A. 469. The weight of
authority is to the effect that the right of a labor union to use coercion and
compulsion by strikes or threats thereof is limited to strikes or threats
thereof against persons with whom the combination has a trade dispute.
Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753, n6 Arn. St. Rep. 272, 6 L. R. A.
N. S. 1667. Likewise it is illegal to coerce the customers or prospective
customers of one with whom the union has no trade dispute to withhol'd
their patronage from him. Thomas v. Cincinnati etc. R. Co., 62 Fed. 8o3;
United States v. Cassidy, 67 Fed. 6g8. Nor is this liability for injury to
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one's business by coercing his customers to cease to patronize him dependent on the fact that contract relations are thereby broken. Gray v.
Bt1ilding Trades Comicil, 91 Minn. 18o, 97 N. W. 666, 103 Am. St. Rep. 477,
63 L. R. A. 753; Jersey City Printing Cq. v. Cassidy, 63 N. ]. Eq. 759, 53
Atl. 230. The decision in the principal case is clearly right, there being no
real trade dispute between the parties and no justification disclos·ed for the
acts of the defendants. See generally, COOLEY TORTS (3rd ed.) 597-6o8. See
also Ertz v. Produce Exclza11ge, 79 Minn. 140, 81 N. W. 737, 79 Am. St.
Rep. 433, 48 L. R. A. 90. For cases apparently contra to rule of principal
case see J. F. Parkinson Co; v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98
Pac. 1027, 21 L. R. A. N. S. 550; State v. Van Pelt, 136· N. C. 633, 49
S. E. 177, 68 L. R. A. 76o.
VX:NDO;R AND PURCHASER-TIME OF THE EssENCE.-Plaintiff agreed to sell
certain land 1o the respondent, The purchase was to be completed by a
fixed date, and time was to be "in all respects strictly of the essence of the
contract." The purchaser· was accidentally prevented from completing at
the fixed date, by the sickness of his attorney, and the vendor claimed a
right to rescind the contract. In an action by the purchaser for specific
performance Held, the vendor was entitled to rescind. Brickles v. Snell
'[i916] 2 A. C. 599, 86 L. J. P. C. 22.
Time is. not of the essence of an agreement to convey land unless it is
expressly so stipulated; or follows by necessary implication from the nature
of the transaction. Cromwell v. Cliiito1~ Realty Co., 67 N. ]. Eq. 540, 58-Atl.
1030. There ai:e, however, a few decisions to the contrary. Crippin v. Heermance, Clarke. Ch. (N, Y.) .133. But when the contract is m~rely an option
to purchase the courts are agreed that time should be of the essence. McK e11zie v. °l.forphy, 31 Colo. 274, 72 Pac. 1oj5. The reason for thfs is apparent. Any extension of time in such a case might work the prospective
vendor irreparable injury. -But a contract of that nature is not _involved
in the principal case. The right to rekct title if it is proved legally defective, and the obligation to accept if it is valid, leaves the vendee no
option. The most reasonable construction of a contract such as the one in>olved here would seem to be that the equitable title vested when the contract was entered into; subject io be divested if the vendor should be unable to make good -title. But if this view is not taken it must be plain
that the vendor-purchaser relation must have been established at the expiratipn ~f the ten days at which time, as provided· by the contract, the
title would· be. deemed accepted if no written obj ecticin were made tliereto.
The vendor-purchaser. relation ·having been established then under either
])ossible view, the question arises whether ·the· estate· of the latter· ,:;hould
be divested for failure to perfonn what must properly be considered a
condition subsequent. The _ven'dor could have had specific performance of
the contract, and the injury which resulted to him from the trivial' default
of the purchaser was so slight that enforcement of the stipulation making
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time of the essence, would be, substantially, the inposition of a penalty. See
note to Wells v. Smith, 31 Am. Dec. 278, and 2 Lead Cases Eq. II34; Po~n:
r.oY EQ. §455·
WILLS-ELECTION oF Wrnow TO TAKE UNDER WILL EsToPPING HER To
TAKE INTESTATE PROPERTY.-Testator gave the residue of his property to
his wife and son in equal shares, but the devise to the son lapsed upon his
death during the life of the testator, and the testator died intestate as to
this property. It was contended on ~half of the widow of the testator that
she was entitled to this intestate property, she being the sole heir at law
of her husband. Held that since the widow had elected to take under the
will she was estopped from taking any portion of her husband's estate except that given her under the will; and that the property as to which he
died intestate went to those who would inherit had the deceased left no
widow. fo Re McAllister's Estate (l\Iinn. 1917), 160 N. W. 1016.
Upon the point here presented there seems to be an irreconcilable conflict of authority. See in accord with the principal case, fo Re Benson, g6
N. Y. 499, 48 Am. Rep. 646; Compt01i v. Ackers, 96 Kan. 229, 150 Pac. 219.
In an English case where the wilt expressly declared that certain provisions
were made in lieu of dower, the court declared that the provisions applied
only to such part of the estate as was disposed . of by the testator, and
the widow was not excluded from sharing in intestate property. Naismith
v. Boyes [1899], A. C. 495. The same rule was followed in Tho111pso1~s
Estate, 229 Pa. SAZ, 79 At!. 173; Bane v. Wick, 14 Ohio St. 505; Kaser v.
Kaser, 68 Ore. 153, 137 Pac. i87; Sutton v. Read, 176 Ill. 6g, 51 N. E. 8o1.
Contra Ellis v. D11mo11d, 259 Ill. 483, 102 N. E. 8o1. In Demoss v. Demoss,
47 Tenn. 256, where it was not expressly stated to have been·in lieu of dower,
the court decided in favor of the widow, basing their opinion upon the
interpretation of ·their statute. Cf. Collins v. Collins, 126 Ind. 559, 25 N. E.
704 In Beshore v. Lytle, II4 Ind. 8, 16 N. E. 499, the court noticed the fact
that the will gave the widow no "separate or individual estate," but merely
made her a trustee, therefore her election to take under the will was not
inconsistent with her claim to an ultimate share under the Jaw. See in
accord, Micherson v. Bowly, 4g. Mass. 424; State v. Holmes, ns Mich. 456,
73 N. W. 5~8; Philleo v. Holliday, 24 Tex. 38; Bost v. Bost, 57 N. C. 484.
Also, l CoL. LAW ~v. 521.
WILLS-INCORPORATION OF FUTURE EVENT AS PART OJ.' ORIGINAL DESCRIP'.!'ION.-Testatrix devised an -estate to an affiicted son for life with remainder
to "either one of my children who will take him into "their family and see
that he is supported and treated well"; no child was named to perform this
duty. After the death of the life tenant, despite the fact that there is no
dispute as to who did fulfil the condition by caring for the invalid, it is contended that this provision is void for uncertainty. Held (one justice dissenting) that the attempt to dispose of the remainder failed because the testatrix
did not name or sufficiently designate which of the children should care for
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the "life-tenant and thereby become entitled to the remainder. S1tmmers v.
Sitmmers (Ala. 1916), 73 So. 401.
In Lehnhoff v. Theine, 184 Mo. 346, 83 S. W. 469, an estate was given to
those who paid for <the maintenance of testator, but the court found that
the one who claimeQ to have fulfilled the provision was indebted to the
testator, and as a matter of fact there was no person who answered the requirements. The same question was before the court in Fiester v. Shepard,
92 N. Y. 251,,on an appeal from the Surrogate court, but the case was dismissed on the grounds that the lower court had no jurisdiction. The writer
of the opinion in the principal case expresses his dissent from the decision of
the court, and cites De1mis v. Holsapple, 148 Ind. 297, 47 N. E. 631, 46
L. R. A. 168, 62 Am. St. Rep. 526, in support of his dissent. The theory of
the dissent is that where an intention clearly appears in a will tqat a gift
should vest in a person to_ be ascertained upon the happening of a certain
event or· by the performance of certain conditions, the will is not void for
uncertainty, but the gift will vest in such person who does answer the description, for example, th-a determination of the members of a class. See
.Pesting v. Allen, 12 M. & W. 279. If the vesting of the gift. may depend
upon a contingency, then, as was decided in Stubbs v. Sargon, :2 Keen :256,
an. event to happen. in the future may form part of the original description
of the devisee. See in accord Howard v. American Peace Soc., 49 Me. 288;
Shepard v. ShePar._d, 57 ·Conn. 24, 17 Atl. 173. ·
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-EXCLUSIVE CHARACTE~ OF REMEDY.-In
an action under §§1902-19o8, Code of Civ. Proc., by an intestate's surviving
brothers and sisrers against his employer to recover damages resulting from
intestate's deatli caused by the employer's negligence, the employer interposed
the WORKMEN'S CoMPSNSA'l'ION ACT as a defense, it appearing that the deceased was employed in an occupation to which the ACT applied, and that he
left no wife, children, or othe~ kin answering the description of those entitleP. to compensation under the .ACT. The Supreme Court sustained plaintiff's demurrer to this answer. Shanahan v. Monarch Engineering Company,
156 N. Y. Supp. 143· The Appellate Division affirmed this decision .in 159
-~· y:. ~upp 257._ pn appeal to the Court of Appeals it was held th.at the
order of the Appellate Division be reversed on the ground that the remedy
provided by the WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT was exclusive, and tl;lat
the surviving adult brothers and sisters of a servant killed in service had
po right of action. Shanahan v. Monarch Engineet:ing Co. (N. Y. 1916),
II4 N. E. 795·
The principal. case turns upon ithe construction of the statute providing
a remedy for death of an employee. The court construes the word "exciusive,'' app-aaring· in §u of the ACT as me~ning that the remedy pro~ided
by the ACT for those enumerated as beneficiaries, not only excludes any other
;;iction by them, but it also t;!Xcludes any action by those not enumerated:
Hence the plaintiffs in this action, not being named as beneficiaries in the
ACT~ cannot maintain an action. The rule of ~tatutory construction involved
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is that where a statute institutes a new remedy for an existing right, it does
not take away a pre-existing remedy without express words or necessary
implication. Applying this rule to the principal case, it would seem that
the correct result was reached. The same rule was applied with the opposite
result in Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v. Mitchell, 26 Colo. 284, 58 Pac.
28. The Colorado statute in the latter case was, however, silent as to the
exclusiveness of the remedy. If damages for wrongful death are punitive
as well as· compensatory, it would seem that the construction adopted iby the
New York Court might, in certain cases like the principal one, allow an
employer to escape the consequences of his negligence; but unless the word
"exclusive" as used in the New York statute can be interpreted to mean
that the remedy provided is exclusiv.e so far as provision is made for beneficiaries, and that as in this case no provision was made for adult brothers
and sisters, then the old remedy applies, there is no escape from the conclusion of the New York Court.
WORKMAN'S COMPJ>NSATION Acr:-WHAT IS HAZARDOUS EMPLOYMJON'l'?-

On appeal to the New York Court -of Appeals, the case of Fogarty v. National Bisrnit Co., 161 N. Y. Supp. 937, was reversed, holding it not necessary that the deceased have been himself immediately engaged in a hazardous occupation, but that the statute is satisfied if the deceased were doing
~n act, at the time of the accident, which was fairly incidental to the prosecution of a business enumerated in the statute as "hazardous." Fogarty v. National B11srnit Co. (N. Y. 1917), n5 N. E. -.
.
For a criticism of the decision in the lower court, see 15 MICH. L. Rsv. 528.

